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Steve Alpem and Dennis J. Snower
LFE-NTS
ABSTRACT
The paper shows that when workers have some market power and face 
substantial uncertainty concerning their productivity, it may be in their 
interest to formulate their wage claims with a view to the information 
thereby revealed. This learning behavior may in turn be responsible for 
unemployment. Our analysis shows how the process of information 
acquisition through wage claims generates a higher rate of youth 
unemployment and long-term unemployment and a lower dismissal 
probability for incumbent workers than would otherwise be the case.
JEL Classification: 022,023,026, 821





















































































































































































UNEMPLOYMENT THROUGH ’LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE’ 
by Steve Alpern and Dennis J. Snower
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes how workers’ wage claims can serve as a 
learning tool. We argue that when workers have some market power and 
face substantial uncertainty in the labor market, it may be in their 
interests to formulate their wage claims with a view to the 
information thereby revealed, in order to make more informed wage 
claims in the future. This learning behavior can have an important 
by-product: unemployment. Our analysis shows how the process of 
information acquisition through wage claims generates
(a) rate of youth unemployment and long-term unemployment that are 
higher, and
(b) dismissal probabilities for incumbent workers that are lower 
than would otherwise be the case.
We construct a model of wage setting in which the central problem 
is one of asymmetric information: Workers are assumed to have less 
information than their employers about their marginal revenue products 
(MRPs), and are able to acquire MRP information from their employers 
by making wage claims and observing the resulting job offers.
In this context, a worker has the incentive to gain MRP 
information through his wage claims if his actual MRPs (about which he 
has imperfect information) are correlated through time. This implies 
that when the worker acquires information about his current MRP, he 
thereby also gains information about his future MRP. Examples of 
situations in which workers face uncertain and autocorrelated MRPs are 
easy to come by. A new entrant to the labor force may have little 
knowledge of his future MRPs at any particular job but he may expect 
them to be autocorrelated, since his MRP depends on his ability and on 
the technologies associated with the job, both of which change only 
gradually through time. Moreover, when an economy experiences a 
"permanent" macroeconomic shock (i.e. a shock that persists through 




























































































they have reason to expect that these MRPs will be related to their 
future MRPs.
Our model has two important general features:
(i) Information acquisition is not conducted independently of wage 
decisions. In particular, agents gain information by observing the 
consequences of their wage claims. This may be called "learning from 
experience".
(ii) The information that is acquired in this way tends to be 
qualitative rather than quantitative. For example, a worker who 
receives no job offer can infer that his wage claim was "too high"
(say, greater than his MRP), whereas a worker who is hired can infer 
that his wage claim was "too low" or "just right" (say, less than or 
equal to his MRP).
Different wage claims generate different types of information and 
these, in turn, are not all of the same value to the worker. In our 
model, for example, a worker gains more information from a high wage 
claim that elicits a job offer than from a low wage claim that also 
elicits that job offer.'  It is because different wage decisions have 
different information contents that agents have an incentive to make 
these decisions with a view to the quality of information thereby 
revealed. The process of acquiring high-low information through wage 
setting is an example of "high-low search", which has been surveyed in 
Alpera and Snower (1988).
We argue that our analysis may help illuminate the labor market 
experience of various European countries in the wake of the oil price 
shocks in the mid- and late-1970s. An important open question is why 
European real wages remained as high as they did in the face of 
substantial uncertainty. Why did workers not take wage cuts in order 
to reduce their chances of unemployment? Although we do not dispute
^Assuming that the worker knows his marginal product to lie within a 
fixed interval, each observation allows him to infer a lower bound of 
his marginal revenue product. But this lower bound is higher in the 




























































































the various answers that this question has received in the recent 
labor market literature (e.g. in the insider-outsider and 
efficiency-wage theories), we wish to argue here that workers’
"learning by experience" may have had a role to play as well.
The oil price shocks of the mid- and late-1970s were quite 
persistent and initiated prolonged periods of uncertainty regarding 
firms’ sales prospects, factor substitution, and labor productivity.
In the aftermath, many workers are likely to have perceived themselves 
to be facing uncertain but autocorrelated MRPs. We suggest that under 
these conditions - which are consonant with the spirit of our analysis 
- those groups of European workers with sufficient market power may 
have had an incentive to use their wage claims as a learning tool.
Our analysis shows how the information motive underlying wage claims 
may give rise to youth unemployment and make it more difficult for 
senior unemployed workers to get jobs.
However, the potential purview of our analysis extends well 
beyond these historical periods. In the "formal" sectors - where jobs 
are associated with significant labor turnover costs - employees
generally exercise some market power in the wage bargaining process
2
(regardless of whether they are unionized) . Furthermore, these 
employees generally are able to gain information about their current 
MRPs by observing whether they are offered jobs at the negotiated 
wages. Insofar as the determinants of the MRPs (e.g. the employees’ 
abilities, the firms’ technologies) remain reasonably stable through 
time, the employees are able to learn about their future MRPs by 
observing their current job offers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 clarifies the 
relation of our contribution to the relevant literature and explains 
some underlying concepts. Section 3 presents our model of wage 
setting as a learning tool and examines how unemployment can arise as 
result. Section 4 explores the effect of learning on unemployment by 
examining wage formation under alternative learning scenarios.




























































































Finally, Section 5 outlines some practical implications.
2. Related Literature and Underlying Concepts
Some current theories of labor market behavior have implications 
for the relation between uncertainty and unemployment. For example, 
in the search theories of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1970), Pissarides 
(1985) a rise in uncertainty may be associated with a rise in 
"mismatch", which leads to a rise in unemployment (ceteris paribus).
In the theory of employment adjustment costs (e.g. Bertola, (1989), 
Bentolila and Bertola (1988), Nickell (1978, 1986)), and the 
insider-outsider theory (e.g. Lindbeck and Snower (1989)), a rise in 
uncertainty implies a rise in firms’ average hiring, training and 
firing costs required at any given level of employment and therefore 
leads to a drop in employment. In the context of efficiency wage 
theory (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Weiss (1980)), a rise in 
uncertainty may weaken the incentive effect of wages on productivity 
and may thereby induce firms to raise their wage offers and generate
3
more unemployment.
However, the formal implications of these theories for the ways 
in which uncertainty affects unemployment remain largely unexplored. 
Moreover, the theories above are not concerned with the way in which 
learning under uncertainty affects unemployment.
Conventional micro- and macro-economic theory tends to portray 
information acquisition and price-quantity decisions as independent
3
For example, in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, a rise in uncertainty may 
lead to a decline in the effectiveness of monitoring and thereby to a 
rise in the wage that discourages shirking. In the "gift exchange" 
model of Akerlof (1982, 1988), a rise in unecertainty may make it more 
expensive for firms to offer "fair" wages and thus may lead to a fall 





























































































activities. In particular, economic agents are generally seen to make 
their decisions in two stages: first, they acquire their information; 
then, on the basis of this information, prices and quantities are set.
For example, in the New Classical Macroeconomics, the public 
formulates its price expectations, given its information set; and 
given the discrepancy between these expectations and actual prices, 
the levels of production and employment may be determined. We are not 
told what the public does to acquire its current information set and 
there is an implicit presumption that its information acquisition 
activities have no significant macroeconomic implications.
Although we do not deny that learning activities and 
price-quantity decisions are sometimes conducted independently of one 
another, we wish to argue that the conventional theories tend leave 
out an important feature of everyday economic activity, namely, that 
price-quantity decisions may be used as learning tools.
It is useful to distinguish between two different types of 
learning:
(i) "passive learning", whereby agents acquire information merely by 
passively observing their environment, and
(ii) "active learning", whereby agents’ market decisions are made 
with a view to acquiring information.
In practice, the participants in the labor market engage in both 
types of learning. Learning is passive whenever information 
acquisition is not the result of market participation, as when 
workers and firms gain labor market information from the news media 
and friends, and these activities generally do not require them to 
make price-quantity decisions. Yet active learning also has an 
important role to play - and not only with regard to wage setting 
(analyzed here), but also regarding a wide variety of market 
activities. For example, firms that do not produce exclusively to 
order often gain information about the product demands they face by 
putting specified quantities of output up for sale at specified 
prices and observing how much is sold. This may be a major source of 
information when customer surveys are inaccurate or very costly.
Other examples include strikes called by unions in order to gain 




























































































order to gain information about unions’ fail-back positions.
Economic theory has something to say about passive learning, but 
surprisingly little about active learning. The main paradigm for 
analyzing decision making under uncertainty comprises optimization 
subject to constraints that include error terms whose distribution is 
known. For example, the monopoly union model generally portrays the 
union as maximizing its objective function (which depends, say, on the 
real wage and employment) subject to a labor demand function which may 
have an additive or multiplicative error term whose distribution the 
union is assumed to know. The union is not portrayed as making its 
decisions with a view to acquiring more information.
Although the principal-agent literature involves market 
activities (such as advertising, screening and monitoring) that reveal 
information (e.g. the efficiency wage models of Calvo and Wellisz 
(1978), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and Weiss (1980)), the focus of 
attention is the provision of incentives rather than the acquisition 
of new information. In the traditional job search literature (e.g.
Mortensen (1970), Phelps (1970)), agents engage in market activities 
(e.g. bearing the costs of search) in order to elicit wage offers, but 
the search activity takes the form of sampling from a known 
distribution. The search decisions are not made with a view to 
discovering what the distribution is.
The literature on Bayesian learning (e.g. Rothschild (1974)) also 
tends to be about passive learning. Although agents are assumed to 
update their subjective distributions by observing the consequences of 
their actions, the updating is a passive by-product of past search 
activities; it does not provide a motive for these activities.
Our models of active learning are based on the mathematical 
theory of high-low search, developed by Baston and Bostock (1985) and 
Alpern (1985). It has been used to analyze firms’ pricing decisions 
(Aghion, Bolton, and Jullien (1987), Lazear (1986)), the demand for 
inventories (Alpern and Snower (1987a)), and the supply of goods 
(Alpern and Snower (1987b), Reyniers (1989).
This paper analyzes a process of active learning that involves 
the following sequence of decisions: (i) making a wage claim under 




























































































repercussions, and (iii) using these observations to make inferences 
about the market conditions, which (in turn) are used to make 
subsequent wage decisions. The wage decision is based on given 
information, but it is made with a view to providing employment 
observations that reveal an optimal amount of new information. In 
short, the wage setter seeks to "learn" from the employment 
"experience" generated by the wage decision.
3. Wage Setting as a Learning Tool
We use a simple two-period model to show how workers’ wage claims 
can reveal information about their MRP. In particular, let each 
worker have a working life of two periods, so that he may be called 
"young" in the first and "senior" in the second. If he finds a 
vacancy as a young worker, he makes a wage claim w^ (where the 
subscript "y" stands for "young"). Should he get a job in response to 
his wage claim, he becomes an "incumbent" in the second period of his 
working life. As such, he makes another wage claim, Wj (where the 
subscript "i" stands for "incumbent").
However, should he fail to get a job as a young worker, he joins 
the ranks of the youth unemployed and receives the transfer payment t 
(say, an unemployment benefit). In the second period, he then becomes 
a "senior outsider". If this senior job seeker finds a vacancy, he 
makes a wage claim ws (where the subscript "s" stands for "senior" 
unemployed).
In what follows, we first describe the MRP uncertainty faced by 
the young and the senior workers, then we derive their optimal 
wage claims, and finally we analyze the resulting levels of 
unemployment.
3.1 MRP Uncertainty
A worker’s MRP at a particular job depends both on the 
characteristics of that worker (such as his ability and motivation) 




























































































cooperating factors associated with the job and the prospects of 
selling the output). Whereas the worker may be expected to know more 
about the former characteristics than his employer, the employer may 
be expected to know more about the latter characteristics. Since our 
aim is to show how a worker’s wage claim can reveal information about 
his MRP, we start by assuming that the employer has the informational 
advantage and we then examine how the worker can use his wage claim as 
a tool to gain some of the information available to his employer.
To put this idea into sharp focus, let the actual value of the 
worker’s MRP (net of any labor turnover costs) at a particular job, 
ba, be known to the firm but unknown to the worker. The worker’s 
actual MRPs at different jobs are assumed to be iid. Each young 
worker is assumed to have a prior (subjective) notion of the density 
of his MRP at any vacant job. For simplicity, we take this density to 
be uniform over the "uncertainty interval" [(b-v), (b+v)], where b and 
v are positive constants and (b-v)>0. We assume that jobs are 
"idiosyncratic", so that the worker cannot gain information about his 
own MRP by observing the wage claims and employment outcomes of other 
workers. The transfer payment t is assumed to be such that t < (b-v).
The young worker makes his wage claim w^ taking into account this 
transfer payment and the subjective MRP density, and the firm responds 
by making or withholding a job offer. If ba _>_ w , the worker gets the 
vacant job; if ba < w^, he is rejected. By implication, the worker 
will set his wage claim w^ within the MRP uncertainty interval [(b-v), 
(b+v)]. The firm’s employment decisions reveal information to the 
worker: a job offer implies that the worker’s MRP is greater than or 
equal to his wage claim; and a rejection implies that his MRP falls 
short of his wage claim.
As noted in Section 1, if the worker’s MRP when he is young is 
correlated with his MRP when he is senior, then the MRP information he 
gains in the first period may be of value to him in formulating his 
second-period wage claim. To fix ideas, let the worker’s actual MRP, 
ba, be constant over his working life. Then, if he gets a job as a 
young worker at wage w^, his MRP uncertainty interval in the second 
period of his working life becomes [w^, (b+v)]. Here, the size of the 




























































































first-period wage claim (w^). Under these circumstances, we show that 
the young worker has an incentive to make his wage claim with a view 
to gaining MRP information.
On the other hand, if the young worker does not get a job and
4
thus remains unemployed, he seeks a vacancy at a new job in the next 
period. Given that he knows his MRPs at different jobs to be iid, his 
MRP uncertainty interval is that same as that of a young worker:
[(b-v), (b+v)]. In short, whereas a young worker who receives a job 
offer gains MRP information that he can use in formulating his 
second-period wage demand, a young worker who receives no offer does 
not acquire such information.
To derive the optimal wage claims, it is convenient to normalize 
the young worker’s MRP uncertainty interval to [0, 1], as shown in 
Figure 1. Accordingly, any unnormalized wage claim, w, corresponds to 
the following position W in the normalized uncertainty interval:
(la) W = (w - b + v)/(2-v),
any unnormaiized MRP value, b, corresponds to the normalized value, B:
(lb) B =  (b - b + v)/(2-v),
and the unnormalized transfer payment t corresponds to the normalized 
value T:
(lb) T = (b - v - t)/(2-v)
The parameter T has an important role to play in our subsequent 
analysis; it may be interpretted as follows. 2-v is the magnitude of 
the MRP uncertainty interval; and (v - t - b) is the difference 
between the minimum MRP (b - v) and the transfer payment (t), which we





























































































may call the minimum "penalty" associated with unemployment. Thus, T 
may be called the "penalty-uncertainty ratio". Note that a fall in 
the penalty-uncertainty ratio may be due to
- an increase in uncertainty (viz, a rise in v),
- a rise in the transfer payment (t), or
- a fall in the average MRP level (b).
3.2 Wage Claim of the Senior Workers
Our analysis of the optimal wage claims begins with the decision 
problems of the senior workers, whom we have divided into "senior 
outsiders" and "incumbents". Each senior outsider makes a wage 
claim Wg so as to maximize his current expected income,^ given his MRP 
uncertainty interval of [0,1], pictured in Figure 2a. For any given 
wage claim Ws, his prior probability of getting the job (pictured by 
the shaded area to the right of Ws in Figure 2a) is
(2a) Prob (B >_ Wg) = 1 - W$,
and his prior probability of being rejected (pictured by the shaded 
area to the left of W ) is
(2b) Prob (B < Ws) = Ws.
The senior outsider’s problem is to make a wage claim W- that 
maximizes his expected income, Y(0):
(3) Max Y(0) = (1 - Ws)-W s - Wg-T.
'’in other words, the worker’s utility is assumed to be equal to the 
income he receives.





























































































The optimal wage claim is
(4a) Ws* =  max[((l-T)/2), 0],
We call this the "myopic wage", since it is optimal for a worker with 
a one-period time horizon. Let us assume that 0 < T < 1 , which has the
plausible implication that the senior worker makes a wage claim
7
associated with a positive probability of unemployment. Thus.
(4b) Ws* = (l-T)/2.
The corresponding level of expected income is 
(5) Y(0)» = [ i ^ ] 2
Now turn to the incumbent’s decision problem. Having received a 
job offer in response to his wage claim Wy in the previous period, he 
infers that his MRP uncertainty interval is [Wy, 1] (under the 
normalization above). Consequently, his prior probability getting the 
job (pictured by the shaded area to the right of W. in Figure 2b) is
(6a) Prob (B j> W;) = (1 - W.)/(l - Wy),
and his prior probability of being rejected (pictured by the shaded 
area to the left of Wp is
(6b) Prob (B < Wj) = (Wj - Wy)/(1 - W ^.
If the incumbent gets a job offer, his income is W.; and if he 
does not, it is -T. He makes his wage claim Wj so as to maximize his





























































































expected income, Y(Wy), given his MRP uncertainty interval:
(7) Max Y(Wy) = [(1 - Wj)/(1 - Wy)]-W. - [(Wj - Wy)/(1 - Wy)]-T.
It is easy to show that the optimal wage claim is
(8) Wj* = max[((l-T)/2), Wy],
The corresponding level of expected income is
2
(9) Y(Wy)* = [ j - ^ ]  ' [ + T-Wy ] if Wy <. (l-T)/2,
Y(Wy)* =  Wy if Wy J> (l-T)/2.
Observe that if the young worker’s wage claim (Wy) is less than 
the myopic wage ((l-T)/2), then the incumbent’s optimal wage is 
associated with a positive probability of dismissal. On the other 
hand, if the young worker’s wage claim exceeds the myopic wage, then 
the incumbent’s optimal wage is equal to the young worker’s wage. In 
the latter event, the incumbent is certain to be retained, since his 
experience as a young worker indicates that the firm finds it 
profitable to employ him at Wy.
3.3 Wage Claim of the Young Workers
For any wage claim Wy that a young worker makes, his prior 
probability of receiving a rejection is Prob(B < Wy) =  Wy (given by 
the shaded area to the left of Wy in Figure 2a), and the probability 
of receiving a job offer is Prob(B j>_ Wy) = 1 - Wy (given by the shaded 
area to the right of Wy in Figure 2a). We consider each of these 
cases in turn.
What happens when the young worker fails to get a job is pictured 





























































































the next period he searches for a new job as a senior outsider, and 
has a probability (1-p) of finding no vacancy and a probability of p 
of finding one (where p is assumed to be an exogenously given constant 
between zero and unity). In the absence of a vacancy, he again 
receives -T. Yet if he finds a vacancy, he makes another wage claim, 
Ws* (in Equation (4b), which is associated with the expected income 
Y(0)* (in Equation (5)). Thus, the present value of the worker’s 
expected income if he receives no job offer in the first period is
(10) A =  -T +  <5-[p-Y*(0) - (\-p)'T ),
where S is the worker’s time discount factor.
The right-hand side of Figure 3 shows what happens if the young 
worker receives a job offer in response to his wage claim Wy, so that 
he becomes an incumbent in the next period. As we have seen, an 
incumbent’s optimal wage claim is Wj* (in Equation (8)) and his 
expected income is Y(Wy)* (in Equation (9)). Incumbents are assumed 
to face more favorable employment opportunities than senior
g
It is easy to see why the worker has an incentive to seek a new job 
rather than to reapply at the old one, provided that he faces the same 
probability of finding a second-period vacancy in the old job as in 
the new one. The reason is that his uncertainty interval at the old 
firm is [0, W ], where WS<1, whereas his uncertainty interval at a new 
firm is [0, 1], Thus, he found a vacancy at the old firm, his 
expected income resulting from a second-period wage claim W$ would be 
Y(Wy) = Prob(b>W s)-Ws - Prob(b<W s)-T = [(Wy-Ws)AVy]-W s - [Ws/Wy]-T. 
Maximizing this with respect to Ws, we obtain the optimal 
second-period wage claim: W * = (W - T)/2 and the associated level of
s y  ?
second-period expected income is Y * = (W - T) /(4-W ). Froms y y
Equation (5) it is clear that this expected income is identical to the 
expected income from applying for a new job when W =1. Since Wy* < l
and (3Y *)/(3W ) > 0. the expected income from applying to a new jobs y




























































































outsiders. Specifically, we assume that each incumbent has the 
opportunity to reapply for his previous job; thus his probability of 
finding a vacancy is unity (whereas an corresponding probability of a 
senior outsider is p, which may be less than unity).^ By 
implication, the present value of a worker’s expected income if he 
receives a job offer in the first period is [W + <5‘Y(Wy)*].
In sum, the present value of a worker’s lifetime income, given 
optimal second-period wage claims, is
(11) V = Prob(B >_Wy) • [W + <5-Y*(Wy)] + Prob(B<W y)-A
= (1 - Wy)-[Wy + <5-Y*(Wy)] + Wy • A.
The young worker seeks to set his wage claim Wy so as to maximizes 
this present value V. It can be shown that the optimal wage claim is:
(12) Wv - F f l
( 3 -p- (  1 +T)
l 8 - ( l + J )
Observe that the young worker’s wage claim (Wy*) exceeds the 
myopic wage ((l-T)/2), and thus - by Equation (9) - the optimal wage 
claim of the incumbent is equal to that of the young worker:
(8’) W;* =  Wy* s - p - n  + t )8 • U  +'S r
2
To gain an intuitive understanding of these results, observe that 
a young worker faces the following tradeoff when formulating his wage
q
The incumbents’ preferential employment opportunities may be 
rationalized through the insider-outsider theory (see, for example, 
Lindbeck and Snower (1989).) If the firm faces labor turnover costs, 
it may have an incentive to give the incumbents (last period’s 






























































































(a) On the one hand, a rise in his wage claim reduces his 
probability of getting a job in the current period and this 
reduces his expected lifetime income, because (i) the young 
worker’s current income when unemployed (-T < 0) is less than his 
current income from employment (W _>_ 0) and (ii) if he
is unemployed in his youth, he has a smaller chance of finding 
future employment than if he is employed in his youth.
(b) On the other hand, a rise in the wage claim raises his expected 
lifetime income if he does manage to receive a job offer in his 
youth, because the greater his wage claim W , (i) the greater the 
young worker’s current income, and (ii) the smaller his MRP 
uncertainty interval if he becomes incumbent and thus the greater 
the incumbent’s optimal wage claim.
The last element (b.ii) of this tradeoff indicates the role of 
information acquisition in the formulation of the wage claim W^.
Observe that if the young worker does not get a job at W , he gain no 
information of value, since he seeks a new job in the next period. On 
the other hand, if he receives a job at W , he gains valuable 
information, since he can infer that his next period’s MRP 
uncertainty interval is [W , 1], Clearly, the value of this latter 
information depends on the initial wage claim Wy. Thus we see that 
when the young worker raises his wage claim W^, he not only raises the 
probability of gaining no information of value, but also raises the 
value of the information that he does gain in the event of getting a 
job.
4. Unemployment
We are now in a position to evaluate how this use of wage claims 
as a learning tool affects the level of unemployment. Moving from the 
micro- to the macro-economic level, consider a labor market with n 
workers. The actual MRPs of each of these worker across all jobs are 
assumed to be uniformly distributed over the normalized interval 




























































































first period.) Workers are assumed to apply randomly for the 
available jobs.
In accordance with our two-period analytical framework, we assume 
that the labor market contains two generations of workers: in any 
period, there are n/2 "young'' workers and n/2 "senior" workers. All 
workers looking for new jobs (viz, the young workers and the senior 
outsiders) face the same probability p of finding a vacancy. Each 
young worker who finds a vacancy makes a wage claim of Wy*, each 
senior outsider who finds a vacancy claims Ws*, and each incumbent 
claims Wj*.
The levels of unemployment among these workers are summarized in 
Figure 4. The top of the figure shows (n/2) young workers entering 
the labor force in a particular period of time, t. Each of these 
workers faces a probability p-Prob(B>_Wy*) =  p -(l-W y*) of finding 
employment, given the MRP uncertainty interval of [0,1]. When n is a 
slarge number, the level of youth employment (in the top right of 
Figure 4) may be approximated by />‘(l-W y*)-(n/2). Similarly, the 
probability that a young worker will remain unemployed is 
approximately equal to the youth unemployment rate, which is
(13) uy = [1 - p-(l-W y*)]
(where the time subscript is suppressed for simplicity). uy ■ (n/2) is 
the level of youth unemployment.
These unemployed young workers in period t turn into senior 
outsiders in period t + 1, each facing a probability of p ■ Prob(B > W^*) = 
p-(  1 - Ws*) of finding employment, given the MRP uncertainty interval 
of [0,1]. Thus, the number of employed senior outsiders is p-[\  - 
p -(l-W  *)]*(1 - W *)• (n/2). Thus, unemployment rate among the senior
y  s
outsiders is
(14) us =  [1 - P ‘(l-W y*)]-[1 - p -(l-W s*)]
and us • (n/2) is the number of unemployed senior outsiders.
Finally, each incumbent faces a probability of Prob(b > W.*) of 




























































































Prob(B>W .*)-p-(l-W y*)-(n/2). Obversely, the unemployment probability 
of each incumbent is [1 - Prob(B> Wj*)], and thus the 
unemployment rate among incumbents is
(15a) u. = [1 - Prob(B>Wi*)]-p-(l-Wy«),
and Uj- (n/2) is the number of unemployed incumbents.
Since the employment probability of an incumbent is Prob(Bj>_W.*) 
[1 - Wj*]/[1 - Wy*] the number of employed incumbents is p-[  1 - 
Wj*]-(n/2). Moreover, the probability that an incumbent will lose his 
job is Prob(B<W;*) = [Wj* - Wy*]/[1 - W *], so that the 
unemployment rate among incumbents is
(15b) uj = p-[W.* - Wy*] = 0,
since W-* = Wy* (by Equations (8’) and (12)).
Observe that when the vacancy probability p  is positive, the 
youth unemployment rate in our model exceeds that of the senior 
outsiders. The reason does not lie merely in the positive vacancy 
probability, implying that some of the workers who were unemployed in 
their youth do find vacancies once they become senior outsiders.
Beyond that, young workers set their wage claims higher than the 
senior outsiders, because the former have an incentive to gain 
information through their wage claims while the latter do not. 
Consequently each young worker runs a greater risk of having his wage 
claim rejected than a senior worker does.
Also observe that the youth unemployment rate exceeds that of the 
incum bents.^ Due to the information acquisition motive, workers find 
it worthwhile to make wage claims over their working lifetimes so as
^®It is worth noting that our extreme result of zero unemployment among 
incumbents is an artifact of our two-period framework of analysis.
For long time horizons it can be shown that incumbents make wage 




























































































to bear greater risk of becoming unemployed when they are young (and 
wage claims can reveal MRP information) than when they are incumbents. 
As incumbents, they take advantage of previously-gained MRP 
information partly through higher wages and partly through greater job 
security than they achieve in the absence of learning.
Furthermore, note that the unemployment rate among senior 
outsiders exceeds that among incumbents. This is not merely due to 
differences in these workers’ vacancy probabilities (i.e. each 
incumbent is sure to find a vacancy, whereas each senior outsider 
finds a vacancy only with probability p). Even if the senior 
outsiders’ vacancy probability is p = \ in our model (so that the senior 
outsider and the incumbents have the same chance of finding a 
vacancy), some senior outsiders remain unemployed whereas incumbents 
do not. The reason is that incumbents have more information about 
their MRPs than the senior outsiders do, and thus the incumbents can 
afford to make wage claims that expose them to less risk of rejection 
than the wage claims of the senior outsiders.
The above results may be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the context o f the model above, in which young 
workers make wage claims with a view to acquiring MRP information, the 
youth unemployment rate exceeds the unemployment rate among senior 
outsiders which, in turn, exceeds the incumbents’ unemployment rate.
Figures 5 illustrate the effects of exogenous parameter changes 
on the rates of youth unemployment (u^) and senior unemployment (us). 
Figures 5a and b indicate that both unemployment rates are declining 
functions of the penalty-uncertainty ratio, T. This means that a 
mean-preserving increase in the MRP uncertainty interval (2 • v), a rise 
in the transfer payment (t), and a fall in the average MRP (b) - all 
of which are associated with a fall in T (by Equation (lb)) - will 
raise the rates of youth and senior unemployment.
Figures 5c and d show that these unemployment rates are declining 
functions of the vacancy probability, (p). Thus, although a rise in 
the vacancy probability p leads young workers to raise their wage 




























































































unemployment rates from falling.
The aggregate level of unemployment is [u^ +  u$ +  u.]-(n/2), and 
thus the aggregate unemployment rate is
( 16)  u  =  u y  +  u s +  U j
where u .=0. Figure 6 pictures this aggregate unemployment rate as a 
function of the vacancy probability (p) for T = 0, 0.5, 1.0. We call 
this relation the "unemployment function", for short.
To find the equilibrium unemployment rate for the labor 
market above, we endogenize the vacancy probability p.
In general, this vacancy probability depends on (i) the ratio of 
vacancies to job searchers and (ii) the degree of "mismatch" (i.e. 
information imperfections which prevent vacant jobs from being 
filled by job searchers). For simplicity, let us assume that that 
there is no mismatch in our labor market and that all job searchers 
have an equal chance of finding a vacancy. Then the vacancy 
probability must be equal the the ratio of the number of vacancies to 
the number of unemployed workers, provided that this ratio does not 
exceed unity.
Let m be the aggregate number of available job slots. Since the 
aggregate number of employed workers is (1 - u)-n, the aggregate 
number of vacancies is m - (1 - u) -n. Thus, the ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment is
ri7i m - ( l - u ) ' n  = , . 1 - N
'  ’ u-n u
and N = (m/n), the ratio of job slots to workers, which we take to be 
exogenously given. Consequently, the vacancy probability is
(17b) p = min[(l - i - ^ J i ) ,  1],
Note that when N < 1 (so that p < 1), the vacancy probability (p) depends 
positively on the unemployment rate (u). The reason is that if the 
number of vacancies is less than the number of unemployed workers, an 




























































































vacancies raises the ratio of vacancies to unemployed w orkers.^ The 
relation between the vacancy probability and the unemployment rate we 
call the "vacancy function", for short.
The equilibrium unemployment rate, u*, and the equilibrium 
vacancy probability, p*, lie at the intersection of the unemployment 
function (16) and the vacancy function (17a). This is pictured in 
Figure 6 for three different values of the penalty-uncertainty ratio:
T = 0, 0.5, 1.0.
Recall that an expansion of the MRP uncertainty interval (2-v), a 
rise in the transfer payment to unemployed workers (t), and a fall in 
the average MRP level (b) are all associated with a fall in the 
penalty-uncertainty ratio, T. As Figure 6 illustrates, a fall in T 
shifts the unemployment function upwards in p-u space and thereby 
raise in the equilibrium unemployment rate. In short, a rise in 
uncertainty, a rise in unemployment benefits, or a fall in average 
MRPs all lead to a rise in unemployment.
5. Wages and Unemployment in Different Learning Scenarios
In order to explore the role that "active learning from 
experience" plays in generating unemployment, let us compare our model 
above with two alternate models, which are the same in all respects 
except with regard to workers’ learning behavior. The two alternate 
models have the following salient features:
(i) In the Passive Learning Model, workers face the same conditions of 
uncertainty as in our model above (in particular, each worker’s MRP at 
any job is uncertain and constant through time), but their wage claims
^ T o  take an extreme example, if one vacancy is available to 100 
unemployed applicants, then a unit increase in both the number of 
vacancies (to 2) and the number of applicants (to 101) raises the 




























































































are based only on "passive learning", i.e. the wage claims make use of 
the workers’ available information but are not formulated with a view 
to revealing information. It is clear that such passive learning does 
not generate optimal wage claims for the workers, for we have shown in 
Section 3 that it is in the workers’ interests to use their wage 
claims as tools for acquiring MRP information. Nevertheless it is 
instructive to compare the wage and unemployment outcomes of active 
and passive learning, since the distinctive contribution of our 
analysis to the standard Bayesian updating models lies in the role 
wage decisions play in information acquisition.
(ii) In the No-Learning Model, workers face the same conditions as in 
our model above, except that each worker’s MRPs at any particular job 
is assumed to be statistically independent through time. Consequently, 
a worker’s employment observations in one time period yield no 
information about his MRP in subsequent time periods. In short, the 
worker has no opportunity to "learn from experience" about his MRP by 
observing the employment responses to his wage claims.
Now consider wage formation in the Passive Learning Model. For 
the senior workers, the nature of their decision problem is the same 
as in the Active Learning Model. Each senior outsider makes a wage 
claim (W$(PL)) so as to maximize his expected current income, given an 
MRP uncertainty interval of [0, 1], As in the Active Learning Model, 
his optimal wage claim is the myopic wage:
(18) Ws*(PL) = (l-T)/2,
by Equation (4b); the corresponding level of expected income is Y(0)*, 
given by Equation (5).
Each incumbent’s wage claim (W.(PL)) maximizes his expected 
income, given the uncertainty interval [Wy(PL), 1], By Equation (8), 
his optimal wage claim is




























































































and his expected income, Y[Wy(PL)]*, is given by Equation (9), for Wy 
=  Wy(PL)*.
The difference between the Passive and Active Learning Models 
lies in the behavior of the young workers. Whereas a young active 
learner makes his wage claim with a view to the information he will 
thereby acquire, a young passive learner does not take such 
information into account. Thus, the decision problem of the young 
passive learner may be summarized as follows: For any given wage claim 
Wy(PL), he faces the probability Prob[B >_Wy(PL)] = 1 - Wy(PL) of 
receiving a job offer. In that case, his current income is Wy(PL), 
and his expected future income - given that he does not take account 
of information revealed by the wage claim Wy(PL) - is Y*(0). His 
probability of receiving no job offer is Prob[B< Wy(PL)j, in which case 
his current income is T and his expected future income is (p-Y*(0) + 
(l-p)-T).
The young worker’s problem is to make a wage claim Wy(PL) that 
maximizes the present value V(PL) of his expected income over both 
periods:
(20) Max V(PL) = Prob[b_>Wy(PL)] • [Wy(PL) +  <5-Y*(0)]
+ Prob[b< Wy(PL)]• {-T + <S-[p-Y*(0) - (l-p)-T]}
= [l-Wy(PL)] -[Wy(PL) + <5-[(l+T )/2]2
+ Wy(PL)-{-T + <5-[p-[(l+T)/2]2 - (l-p)-T]},
by Equation (5). Solving this problem, it can be shown that the young 
worker’s optimal wage claim under Passive Learning is:
,21) Wy.(PL) -  « 0 ( 0 ,  ( ! £ )  ■ p - ' » - f < 1+T>2) ) .
From Equations (19) and (21), it is clear that the optimal wage 




























































































(19’) Wj(PL)* = (l-T)/2.
Observe that young workers make lower wage claims than senior 
workers (both incumbents and senior outsiders) in the No Learning 
Model. The intuitive reason is that finding a job in the first period 
of the worker’s lifetime gives him an advantage in the second period, 
for an incumbent is assumed certain to find a vacancy (at his previous 
job), whereas a senior outsider finds such a vacancy only with 
probability p. Thus, it is in the young worker’s interest to make a 
comparatively low wage claim so as to raise his chances of getting 
this advantage. As the vacancy probability p approaches unity, or as 
the worker’s time discount factor 8 approaches zero (so that the 
worker becomes progressively more myopic), the young workers’ optimal 
wage claim (Wy(PL)*) rises to the level of senior workers’ optimal 
wage claim (Ws(PL)* and W^PL)), by Equations (8), (19), and (20).
Now consider the No Learning Model. The difference between the 
MRP uncertainty intervals under Active Learning and No Learning arises 
because of the difference in the assumed behavior of workers’ MRPs 
through time. In the Active Learning Model, as we have seen, workers 
face job-specific MRPs that are unknown but constant through time, as 
in the aftermath of an long-lasting macroeconomic shock that workers 
had not anticipated. It is the stability of the MRPs through time 
that permits incumbents to infer their MRPs from previous employment 
observations. Yet in the No Learning Model, workers’ job-specific 
MRPs are subject to transient shocks, as in the course of transient 
shocks which workers do not anticipate. Here, a young worker who 
receives a job offer in response to his wage claim W^(NL) can infer 
that his current MRP must lie in the interval [Wy(NL), 1], but this 
information is not useful in formulating subsequent wage claims since 
his current and future MRPs are statistically independent. Hence, the 
incumbent’s MRP uncertainty interval - like that of the young worker - 
is [0, 1],
Clearly, the decision problems of the senior outsiders is the 





























































































(22) WS(NL)* = Ws(PL)*,
Since incumbents in the No Learning Model do not have superior
MRP information to senior outsiders, their optimal wage claim is the 
12same as that above. Thus,
(23) Wj(NL)* =  WS(NL)*.
The young workers’ decision problem is also the same in the 
Passive Learning and No Learning Models. To see this, observe that 
the young worker’s current MRP uncertainty interval is [0,1] in both 
models, and those that turn into senior outsiders will clearly face 
the same uncertainty interval. Furthermore, those that turn into 
incumbents also face this uncertainty interval, but for different 
reasons in the two models. In the Passive Learning Models it is 
because the young worker does not make his wage claim with a view to 
reducing his future MRP uncertainty interval, whereas in the No
Learning Model it is because the worker’s MRP in one period is not
13related to his MRP in the next. Hence, the young workers’ optimal 
wage claim in the No Learning Model is
(23) Wy(NL)* = Wy(PL)*.
12This result is an artifact of the two-period framework of our 
analysis. Over longer time horizons, incumbents in the Passive 
Learning Model do gain MRP information even though their wage claims 
are not formulated with a view to eliciting such information.
^O u r conclusion that Wy(PL)* = Wy(NL)* is an artifact of the 
two-period time horizon, because young workers with a longer time 
horizon would anticipate a shrinking of their MRP uncertainty interval 





























































































The optimal wage claims in the Active, Passive, and No Learning 
Models are summarized in Table 1.
Observe that the optimal wage claims in the Active Learning Model 
exceed those in the Passive Learning and No Learning Models: the 
incentive to learn induces the young workers to make greater wage 
claims than they otherwise would, and given that this learning has 
taken, place, the incumbents find it worthwhile to make greater wage 
claims than they otherwise would. The intuitive reason for this 
result emerges straightforwardly when we compare workers’ expected 
incomes in the different models. The present value of a young 
worker’s income in the Active Learning Model is
(24) V(AL) =  Prob[B _> Wy(AL)] • [Wy(AL) +  <5-Y*(Wy (AL))]
+  Prob[B < Wy(AL)]-A
(by Equation (11)), and the corresponding present values in the 
Passive and No Learning Models is
(25) V(j) = Prob[B J> Wy(j)]-[Wy(AL) +  <J-Y*(0))]
+  Prob[B < W (j)]*A, j =  PL, NL
(by Equation (20)). Note that these two present values differ only in 
terms of the incumbent’s expected income (which is Y*(Wy(AL)) in the 
Active Learning Model and Y*(0) in the Passive and No Learning 
Models).
Starting from any particular wage claim Wy =  Wy in all three 
models, a rise in Wy has a different effect on the incumbent’s 
expected income in the two sets of models. In the Passive and No 
Learning Models, a rise in Wy clearly has no influence on the 
incumbent’s income Y*(0) ((3Y*(0)/3Wy) = 0), since the first-period 
MRP information revealed by Wy is irrelevant to his second-period MRP. 
However, in the Active Learning Model, a rise in Wy does affect the 
incumbent’s income Y*(Wy), because here the first-period MRP 




























































































The greater the first-period wage claim (Wy), the smaller the 
incumbent’s MRP uncertainty interval [W , 1], and the greater the 
incumbent’s wage claim can be ((3Y*(Wy)/3Wy) =  1, by Equations (9) and 
(12)). Thus, a rise in the young worker’s wage claim Wy is associated 
with a greater payoff in the Active Learning Model than in the Passive 
and No Learning Models, and consequently the optimal wage claim of the 
young worker is greater in the Active Learning Model than in the 
Passive and No Learning Models.
The implications of these wage comparisons for the unemployment 
rate are straightforward. By Equation (13), the youth unemployment 
rate (Uy) is positively related to the young workers’ wage claim (Wy), 
and thus the youth unemployment rate is greater under Active Learning 
than under Passive or No Learning.
As for the senior outsiders, recall that their wage claim is the 
same in all three models, since their past failure to get job offers 
does not reveal information about their MRPs at the new jobs for which 
they are applying. By implication, in all three models the same 
fraction of the young unemployed in one period remain unemployed in 
the next period. However, since the youth unemployment rate is 
greater under Active Learning than under Passive and No Learning, 
the unemployment rate among senior outsiders is greater under Active 
Learning.
Finally, it can be shown that the unemployment rate among 
incumbents is smaller under Active Learning than under Passive or No 
Learning. To see this, recall that under Active Learning the 
incumbents’ MRP uncertainty interval is [Wy(AL), 1], and the 
incumbents set their wage claim at the lower bound of this interval. 
Consequently no incumbents become unemployed. By contrast, the 
incumbents’ MRP uncertainty interval under No Learning is [0, 1], and 
under Passive Learning is [Wy(PL), 1], and the incumbents’ wage claims 
lie above the lower bounds of these intervals (i.e. W.(NL) = Wj(PL) > 
Wy(PL) _>. 0). This means that some incumbents lose their jobs under 
No Learning and Passive Learning.
Specifically, under No Learning the probability that a young 
worker will gain employment is p-(l-Wy(NL)*) and the probability that 




























































































incumbents’ unemployment rate is
(26a) u.(NL) = p-[ 1 - Wy*(NL)]-W;(NL)*
Under Passive Learning, an incumbent’s probability of job loss is
Prob(B < W^PL) =[Wi(PL) - Wy(PL)]/[l - Wy(PL)]. Thus, the incumbents’
unemployment rate is
(26b) Uj(PL) = p-( 1 - Wy*(PL))-[(W.(PL) - Wy(PL))/(l - Wy(PL))]. 
The results above may be summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: In the analytical context above,
(a) the unemployment rate among the youth and the senior outsiders is 
higher, and
(b) the unemployment rate among the incumbents is lower,
for any given vacancy probability p, when workers when workers use 
their wage claims as an instrument o f "Active Learning" than when they 
engage in ”Passive Learning" or "No Learning".
6. Implications
Of the three models considered above, the Passive Learning Model 
is a "straw man" while the Active Learning and No Learning Models have 
straightforward practical interpretations.
As noted, conventional economic theory on learning deals 
primarily with passive learning: agents are portrayed as gaining 
information (generally through Bayesian updating) and using this 
information in making their market decisions, but not as making their 
market decisions with a view to the information they can thereby 
acquire. We have shown, however, that such passive learning may be 
suboptimal; in our model of learning, workers have an incentive to use 
their wage claims as learning instruments. It is for this reason that 
the Passive Learning Model is merely a "straw man" against which the 





























































































As we have seen, the Active Learning and No Learning Models
differ only with regard to the assumed behavior about workers’ MRPs:
in the Active Learning Model a worker’s MRPs at a particular job are
14perfectly correlated through time, whereas in the No Learning Model 
these MRPs are taken to be statistically independent. In practice, 
workers’ MRPs at given jobs tend to be correlated, but not perfectly 
correlated. In this sense, workers’ potential opportunities for 
gaining information through wage claims may be expected to lie 
somewhere between the two extremes represented by the Active Learning 
and No Learning Models.
On an economy-wide level, the behavior of MRPs in the Active 
Learning Model may be viewed as relevant to "persistent" macroeconomic 
shocks, in particular, shocks that are unanticipated by the workers 
and which may be expected to last for a prolonged span of time. Such 
shocks may lead workers to view their MRPs as uncertain but stable 
through time. By contrast, the behavior of MRPs in the No Learning 
Model may be viewed as relevant to "transient" sectoral shocks, in 
particular, short-lived sectoral changes that are unanticipated by the 
workers. These shocks may leave workers’ average MRPs across all 
sectors unchanged, by may lead them to view their MRPs in a particular 
sector as uncertain and unstable through time.
Our main focus of attention has been on the Active Learning 
Model. This model shows how active learning can generate youth 
unemployment (i.e. unemployment among new entrants to the labor force) 
and long-term unemployment (i.e. unemployment among senior workers who 
were unemployed in their youth). It also indicates how active
14For expositional simplicity, we assumed that these MRPs are constant 
through time, but this is not an assumption of substance. The 
critical feature of the Learning Model is that the information which a 
worker gains about his MRP at a particular job in one time period 
continues to apply in the next time period. For this purpose, the 




























































































learning may help explain why unemployment among these groups tends be 
greater than that among incumbent workers.
Specifically, a marginal wage increase (ceteris paribus) has a 
greater payoff for a young worker under Active Learning than under No 
Learning, because under Active Learning this wage increase means that 
the worker can demand a higher wage if he becomes an incumbent. For 
this reason, young worker have an incentive to make higher wage claims 
- and consequently face a higher incidence of unemployment - when 
there are opportunities for Active Learning than when there are none.
The incumbent takes advantage of his prior MRP information by reaping 
both higher wages and greater job security than he could otherwise 
have achieved. Consequently, the incumbents’ unemployment rate falls 
short of the youth unemployment rate. Moreover, the senior 
outsiders’ unemployment rate lies between these two extremes, for the 
senior outsiders (in contrast to the young workers) have no incentive 
to use their wage claims as learning instruments, and (in contrast to 
the incumbents) cannot take advantage of prior MRP information.
In the context of the Active Learning Model, we have shown that 
an increase in MRP uncertainty (represented by a mean-preserving 
increase in the MRP uncertainty interval) raises the equilibrium 
aggregate unemployment rate. It does so, moreover, by increasing the 
unemployment rates among the young workers and the senior outsiders, 
rather than among the incumbents.
It is important to emphasize that workers have the opportunity to 
use their wage claims as learning instruments, along the lines 
described by our analysis, only when workers (i) view their marginal 
revenue products as uncertain but correlated through time, (ii) have 
less information about their MRPs than their employers do, and (iii) 
are able to exercise market power in the wage determination process.
On these three counts, we may expect our analysis to be relevant to 
European labor markets in the aftermath of "persistent" macroeconomic 
shocks, such as the supply-side shocks of the mid- and late-1970s.
Many European labor markets are characterized by high rate of 
unionization, pervasive job security legislation, and established 
bargaining procedures, and consequently workers wield substantial 




























































































have argued above, "persistent" macroeconomic shocks may lead workers 
to view their MRPs as uncertain but stable through time. These shocks 
- whether of the demand-side or supply-side variety - may be expected 
to have MRP effects that are more widely known to firms than to their 
employees, since firms tend to be more intimately acquainted with 
changes in factor prices, factor supplies, and sales prospects.
The adverse supply-side shocks that initiated the European 
recessions of starting in the the mid- and late-1970s undoubtedly 
brought in their wake periods of persistent uncertainty regarding 
workers’ marginal revenue products. The underlying causes were 
diverse. First, the supply-side shocks induced firms to employ new, 
raw-material-saving technologies which made marginal products of labor 
more difficult to predict than heretofore. Second, the magnitude of 
the business downturns may be expected to have led some European firms 
to shed labor that would have been hoarded in milder recessions. By 
implication, there would be greater MRP uncertainty once the recession 
was over and a new business upturn was beginning, since it is more 
difficult to predict the marginal products of new recruits than of 
hoarded labor. Third, a precipitate fall in aggregate product 
demand - such as the one initiated by the comparatively contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policies in many European countries in the early 
1980s - must have led to greater uncertainty regarding firms’ sales 
prospects and thereby generated MRP uncertainty.
Our model of Active Learning also implies that a rise in 
uncertainty leads to a fall in the outflow rate from the unemployment 
pool (viz, a fall in the employment probabilities of the young workers 
and the senior outsiders) rather than a rise in the inflow rate to the 
unemployment pool (viz, increased firing of incumbents).
The conclusions above - particularly those concerning youth 
unemployment and long-term unemployment, as well as the effect of 
uncertainty on unemployment - are broadly in consonance with the 
European unemployment experience in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. ^
'■’Note that some of these predictions are similar to those of the 




























































































Of course, our model is far too simple and too single-mindedly 
learning-oriented to be of use as a predictive instrument on its own. 
Our analysis merely serves to suggest that workers’ use of wage claims 
as learning instrument may contribute to unemployment.
underlying rationale is quite different. Our theory examines how 
unemployment can arise through the use of wage claims as tools of 
active learning, whereas the insider-outsider theory describes the 





























































































Akerlof, George, 1982, "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," 
Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 97, 543-569.
Akerlof, George, and Janet L. Yellen, 1988, "Fairness and
Unemployment," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 
May, 78, 44-49.
Aghion, Philippe, Patrick Bolton, and Bruno Jullien, 1987, "Learning 
through Price Experimentation by a Monopolist facing Unknown 
Demand," Working Paper No. 8748, University of California, Berkeley.
Alpern, Steve, 1985, "Search for a Point in an Interval, with High-Low 
Feedback," Math. Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc., 98, 569-578.
Alpern, Steve, and Dennis J. Snower, 1987a, "Inventories as an 
Informastion-Gathering Device," ICERD Discussion Paper No. 87/151, 
London School of Economics, London.
_____ , 1987b, "Production Decisions under Demand Uncertainty: the
High-Low Search Approach," Discussion Paper No. 223, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, London.
_____ _ 1988, "’High-Low Search’ in Product and Labor Markets,"
American Economic Review, May, 78(2), 356-362.
Baston, V.J., and F.A. Bostock, 1985, "A High-Low Search Game on the 
Unit Interval," Math. Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc., 97, 345-348.
Bentolila, Samuel, and Guiseppe Bertola, 1988, "Firing Costs and Labor 
Demand: How Bad is Euroscelosis?" mimeo.
Bertola, Guiseppe, 1989, "Job Security, Employment and Wages," mimeo.
Calvo, Guillermo, and Stanislav Wellisz, 1978, "Supervision, Loss of 
Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm, Journal o f Political 
Economy, 86. 943-952.
Diamond, Peter, 1982, "Aggregate Demand Management in Search 
Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, 86, 943-952.
Lazear, Edward P., 1986, "Retail Pricing and Clearance Sales,"
American Economic Review, 76, 14-32.
Lindbeck, Assar, and Dennis J. Snower, 1989, The Insider-Outsider 
Theory o f Employment and Unemployment, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Mortensen, Dale T., 1970, "A Theory of Wage and Employment Dynamics," 
in E. Phelps, et al., 1970.
Nickell, Stephen. 1978, "Fixed Costs, Employment and Labour Demand 




























































































_____ , 1986, "Dynamic Models of Labor Demand," in Handbook o f Labor
Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, Amsterdam: 
North-Holland.
Phelps, Edmund, S., 1970, "Money Wage Dynamics and Labor Market 
Equilibrium," in E. Phelps, et al., 1970.
_____ , et al., 1970, Microeconomic Foundations o f Employment and
Inflation Theory, New York: Norton.
Pissarides, Christopher, 1985, "Short Run Equilibrium Dynamics of 
Unemployment. Vacancies and Real Wages," American Economic Review, 
75.
Reyniers, Diane, 1987, "Active Learning about the Demand Distribution 
in the Newsboy Problem," Management Science, forthcoming.
Rothschild, Michael, 1974, "A Two-Armed Bandit Theory of Market 
Pricing," Journal o f Economic Theory, 9, 185-202.
Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph Stiglitz, 1984, "Equilibrium Unemployment as 
a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, 74(3),
433-444.
Weiss, Andrew, 1980, "Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with 





























































































The Active Learning Model
Young worker*: Wy(AL)* = [ ^ ]  + ]•
S e n io r  outsiders: Ws(AL)* = ( l - T ) / 2 .
In cu m b en ts: W.(AL)* =  +  ( V r T T T T ^ ] -
The Passive Learning and No-Leaming Models 
Young workers: Wy(PL)* = Wy(NL)* =
Senior outsiders: Ws(PL)* =  Ws(NL)* =  (l-T)/2.
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FIGURE 2a: The Wage Decision of a Young Worker and a Senior Outsider
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F igure S 6  S e n i o r  u n e m p l o y m e n t  as a  f u n c t i o n  o f  p e n a l t v / u n c e r t a i n t y
p -  0 .5








































































































F igure  5 c  Y o u t h  u n e m p l o y m e n t  as a  f u n c t i o n  o f  v a c a n c y  p r o b a b i l i t y
P
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